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Economic growthThe aim of this paper is to provide an analysis of the impact of investment in health-policies on economic de-
velopment. In order to do this, it is vital to bear in mind the fact that long-term economic growth is charac-
terized by the interaction between the physical aspects of capital dynamics and the disease level in a
developing country which lacks a ﬁnancial market. The OLG model will be used in our analysis. Notice that
the level of investment in health policies and disease management are one of the key variables of the
model. It is, therefore, interesting to observe that an increase in capital may have either a direct or indirect
impact on the stationary disease level and lead to effective prevention and disease control.
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A study carried out by theWorld Health Organization in 2001, clear-
ly demonstrated that AIDS, malaria, and tuberculosis are diseases with
the highest mortality rates. In the year 2000 alone, these diseases
were responsible formore than 6 million deaths. Since 1981, the devas-
tating ravage of Immunodeﬁciency Syndrome (HIV/AIDS), one of
history's most deadly pandemics, has caused the deaths of more than
25 million people. If we focus our attention, merely, upon the dramatic
consequences of these three highly-infectious diseases, it can be clearly
observed that they have affected entire regions and countries.
According to the UNAIDS and WHO's report (2008) the pandemic is
still progressing at an alarming rate: “The number of people living
with HIV worldwide continued to grow in 2008, reaching an estimated
33.4 million [31.1 million–35.8 million]. The total number of peoplee terms of the Creative Com-
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blished by Elsevier B.V. All rights reliving with the virus in 2008 was more than 20% higher than the num-
ber in 2000, and the prevalence was roughly threefold higher than in
1990.”, p.7. Effectively, since the beginning of the epidemic, nearly
60 million people have contracted HIV/AIDS, and 25 millions of those
have perished. Recent epidemiological trends (UNAIDS Global Report,
2012) would seem to suggest that Sub-Saharan Africa suffers most of
the disease burden. Representing over 2/3 (69%) of all people living
with HIV and nearly 3/4 (70%) of AIDS-related deaths in 2011,
Sub-Saharan Africa remains the hardest-hit region on a global level.
In 2011, an estimated 1.8 million people living in this region while
the number of people acquiring HIV infection in 2001 was equal to
2.4 million. Over 14 million children lost either one parent or became
orphans due to AIDS-related mortality in each of the countries where
HIV was present in more than 10% of the adult population. With 26%
of the adult population affected by AIDS, Swaziland is themost severely
affected country worldwide (UNAIDS, 2012). Economic underdevelop-
ment is also a determining factor and largely responsible for the ravag-
ing effects of the epidemic (e.g. The World Health Report, 2008).
The very nature, widespread transmission and long-lasting effects
of this disease account for the negative economic repercussions. From
micro-economic viewpoint, Sachs (2005), noted that the destruction
which HIV/AIDS causes in society can be compared to the ravages it
causes in the human organism. It attacks the core of society as a
whole, affecting people from all social backgrounds – men, women,
breadwinners – those who live and protect the entire community
are severely affected. In families, the direct cost of HIV/AIDS can be
measured through loss of human life and the loss of employmentserved.
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fact that Aids eradicates both individuals and families implies that it
will also have dreadful repercussions on the nation's economy. Effec-
tive prevention and disease control, at an individual level is essential
in halting and reversing the spread of HIV/AIDS. Prevention efforts
would appear to be hampered since HIV/AIDS alters the agent's future
expectations. An increased mortality rate, and a decline in life expec-
tancy do not encourage investment and savings in the most heavily
affected countries. From an overall point of view, HIV/AIDS can lead
to reduced economic growth. According to Bonnel (2000), the causal-
ity between economic growth and disease is complex: “As shown by
the previous system of equations the relations between HIV/AIDS and
economic development are complex, particularly because of reverse
causality. While HIV/AIDS reduces economic growth, economic
growth can increase or decrease the spread of the HIV epidemic. On
one hand, economic development can slow down the spread of the
HIV epidemic. On the other hand, the process of economic develop-
ment can facilitate the spread of the HIV epidemic.” p.4. Governments
of developing countries are responding with large-scale preventive
measures in the ﬁeld of healthcare and disease management to pro-
tect future generations and ensure stable economic growth. Indeed,
the Government may modify the intertemporal allocation of re-
sources. Thus pensions are funded directly by the savings, or by the
Government who imposes transfers between generations indirectly.
More recently, the overlapping generations model has a new ﬁeld
of application in the ﬁeld of health economics. This model is particu-
larly adapted in the study of consequences of the economic policy on
the evolution of the economy. Also this setup allows us to examine in
depth the allocation of resources between generations. With the as-
sumption of uncertain life expectancy due to an epidemiological
shock, this model allows us to study the interactions between long
term economic growth and disease evolution. Indeed, the economic
costs of disease are considerable especially in developing countries
(Bloom and Canning, 2006; Pritchett and Summers, 1996). More, on
the microeconomic level, the OLG model integrates behavior and in-
centives of agents in terms of prevention and investment. Demo-
graphic, disease affects in particular the structure of mortality and
morbidity with consequences on dimensions microeconomic and
macroeconomic developments. The intensiﬁcation of disease can re-
sult in a reduction of the stock of physical capital as the factory,
means of transportation… To our knowledge, this choice of modeling
from generations of agents incorporating a disease is especially
presented by Chakraborty (2004, 2007), Momota et al. (2005) assum-
ing that agents can be infected and die prematurely. Preventive be-
havior change plays an important role in reducing the prevalence of
the disease. In this context, the preventive behavior of agents in the
neo-classical theory is studied with the probability of survival from
one period to another. The probability is determined endogenously.
It depends particularly on the agent's health investment and the
disease level. In the end, the dynamics of the economy is modiﬁed
by the presence of the disease. Recent empirical studies highlight
the complexity of the links between wealth and disease (Bloom and
Canning, 2006; Pritchett and Summers, 1996). These complex inter-
actions between the disease level and capital level1 are examined in
a simple discrete-time model. Health investment appears as a key
variable synthesizing these interactions. Our objective is to investi-
gate the long-term impact of the disease on economic equilibrium.
By modeling the decisions of agents focusing on the different ways
in which a disease affects an economy. So we also explore the role
of variables and parameters key interactions between the disease
and the economic equilibrium of long-term.1 Goenka et al. (2010) integrate an epidemiological model in a growth model on a
ﬁnite horizon and continuous time. The structure of the model and its properties are
very complex (bifurcation, multiple equilibria…).The rest of the paper will be organized as follows: in Section 2, the
model and the agent's behavior will be explored, then, in Section 3,
the equilibrium and the dynamics of the economy will be assessed.
In Section 4, our theoretical results by numerical examples and simu-
lations will be presented. This will, ﬁnally, bring us to the conclusion
of our paper in Section 5.2. Model: disease, consumer behavior and technology
Our analysis is based upon the overlapping generations. Agents of
the same generation are assumed to be identical. They can live, at
most, for two periods. Thus, the total population in any given period is
composed of the young generation born during the period under con-
sideration, t(t ≥ 0) and that of an older generation born at t − 1. At
the initial period (t = 0), we must ﬁrst take into account the existence
of an older initial generation. In the periods to follow, the population is
made up of Nt young agents born during that period and Nt − 1 × qt − 1
older agents born at period t − 1. They survived until period t with
probability 0 b qt − 1 b 1, ∀t. Thus, the number of total population at
period t is equal toNt + Nt − 1 × qt − 1. It can be assumed that children
are protected from disease until adulthood (e.g. Chakraborty, 2004;
Momota et al., 2005). Within a different framework, the very same
hypothesis is outlined by Boucekkine and Laffargue (2010). It can
be observed that the population of young infected agents disappears
at the end of the ﬁrst period. Therefore, each young agent bears
Nt + 1 / Nt = 1 + n offspring and fertility is assumed to be exogenous,
taking into account the growth rate factor n ≥ 0. So, the inelastic labor
agent supply is independent of the current disease level. Our analysis
also investigates the case of LCD's (least developing countries) in
which theGovernment sets up a public guarantee funds system in an ef-
fort to reduce endemic uncertainty (Sachs, 2005). Moreover, empirical
studies conducted by WHO highlight the effects of the dysfunctions of
healthcare on micro- and macro-economic level in developing coun-
tries (cf. Summers, 2005). According to theWHO (2008), this consider-
ation explains the relevance of the intervention of the Government. It
also provides a public health policy. Apart from the importance of the
health system, WHO highlights the crucial role of ﬁnancial and mone-
tary institutions in the ﬁght against disease. We know that ﬁscal policy
can cover several objectives at the same time. In the presence of disease,
the Government may seek more to regulate economic activity in modi-
fying the tax effort. Thus, the Government can change the allocation of
resources hence the consumption, health investment and the economic
growth rate. Taxation then plays an essential role in the current pro-
gram of ﬁght against disease and stimulates economic development.
At the beginning of a period, young agents, Nt, allocate part of their
wage rate, it, in the public guarantee funds in order to receive income
in the second period. Hence, the total contribution collected is
established: It = it × Nt. TheGovernment acts as an insurance company
which costs nothing, but which bears no proﬁt. During the next period,
the income from investment is equal to Rt + 1 × It, taking into account
the interest rate factor (Rt + 1 ≡ 1 + rt + 1) and rt + 1 the market rate
of return during the period t − 1. The guarantee funds redistribute to
all those who have survived from the older generation Rt + 1 × it / qt.
It is shown that agents who survive for two periods consume all their
resources.2
In order to improve his surviving probability, qt, each young agent
invests zt in order to ensure good health at period t. Moreover, this
probability depends also on the degree of prevalence of the disease
at period t which noted Xt. Let us deﬁne Xt as disease level like
Momota et al. (2005). The index summarizes all the parameters,
such as the degree of insanity environment medical technology,2 In this context, agents are encouraged to choose a system regulated by the Govern-
ment: the actual return of the guarantee funds Rt + 1 / qt is higher that the market's re-
turn: Rt + 1 / qt > Rt + 1.
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that Xt > 0 when the disease is present.
qt ¼ q zt ;Xtð Þ; with q′z > 0 and q′Xb0 : ð1Þ3
The agent's health investment increase his life expectancy
q′z > 0
 
, but this effect can be offset by the disease level at the mac-
roeconomic q′X > 0
 
. We assume the existence of a direct causality
between zt and Xt, this can be expressed in a simpliﬁed form. The
global effect of individual investment in healthcare and health sector
policies can be taken into account in the deﬁnition of the aggregate
amount, Zt. This variable measures more exactly, the potential bene-
ﬁts of individual healthcare investment related to the disease level
(cf. Grossman, 1972). This global variable set up can be understood
in a number of ways. Like Momota et al. (2005), it is possible to deﬁne
this aggregate amount by calculating the sum of individual decisions
made by a representative agent in the neoclassical viewpoint. In our
case, the global effect of an individual's health investment can be
deﬁned by the following function: Zt = l × zt, whereby l∈ l ; l
h i
. The
parameter l characterizes the representative agent's potential bene-
ﬁts reaped from his investment in the ﬁeld of healthcare, disease
management and prevention related to the disease level.
Young agents are endowed with one unit of labor. They allocate
their wage rate of the ﬁrst period (wt) between health investment
(zt), consumption (ct) in the ﬁrst period and contribution in the guar-
antee fund (it). The contribution is proportional to the wage rate:
it = τ × wt, where the constant marginal tax rate τ is ﬁxed by the
Government. The tax is proportional to the work income of the
young agents. This mechanism supports the physical capital accumu-
lation. Government policies can thus improve the ﬁght against dis-
ease. In this respect, disease level has an indirect effect on capital
accumulation. We assume that old agents consume all their income
received from the public guarantee funds. This second period con-
sumption is noted dt + 1. In this context, the choices made by the rep-
resentative agent depend upon his surviving probability qt. But he
estimates his surviving probability q^tð Þwhen he calculates her second
period income.4 Thus, budget constraints of the agent are expressed:
ct + zt = (1 − τ) × wt and dtþ1 ¼ Rtþ1  τwt=q^t . The agent maxi-
mizes his utility under the previous constraints by taking into account
his life expectancy. If he lives one period, then his utility is expressed
as: u(ct). If he lives for two periods, his expected utility is equal to:
E(V) = u(ct) + β × q(zt, Xt) × v(dt + 1), with V′ > 0, V″ b 0, and
β > 0 the time discount factor. At the beginning of the ﬁrst period,
the agent maximizes his expected utility:
dE V½ 
dzt
¼−u′ 1−τð Þ wt−ztð Þ þ β  q′z zt ;Xtð Þ  v Rtþ1  τwt=q^t
  ¼ 0:
ð2Þ
The intuition for this relationship is as follows. Agents increase
their health investment up to the point where the second period
expected marginal utility increase is offset by the marginal disutility
of the ﬁrst period consumption decrease.
The following Property is obtained:
Property 1. There is a unique zt⁎ which satisﬁes the ﬁrst-order
condition (2).
The proof of Property 1 is expressed in Appendix A.
The consumer choices can be characterized by several properties
which are well-worth mentioning. First and foremost, the agent's
optimal health investment zt ¼ g wt ;Rtþ1;Xt ; q^tð Þ is dependent upon3 q′Z≡∂q zt ;Xtð Þ=∂zt :
4 From this assumption, it results that agent's surviving probability in the steady
state differs from the expected average probability.on the agent's wage rate, wt, the prices, (wt, Rt + 1), the disease
level, Xt, and the agent's estimation of surviving probability, q^t . This
is one of the key ﬁndings of our model (theory). Before moving on
to an in-depth assessment of zt⁎, we can compare the properties of
our function to those of Momota et al. (2005) and Chakraborty et al.
(2007). In the ﬁrst contribution, there is a direct relation between
preventive behavior change and disease, ht⁎ = h(Dt). In the endoge-
nous growth setup, Chakraborty et al. (2007) obtain an optimal pre-
ventive behavior which depends on the disease and the wage rate.
In our neoclassical model, the interaction between these two vari-
ables, zt⁎ and Xt, is more general due to the fact that we take into ac-
count the role of prices. Now, we will present main results concerning
comparative statics. We use the implicit function theorem from the
ﬁrst-order condition (2) deﬁning function φ zt ;wt ;Xt ; rtþ1; q^t
  ¼ 0
(cf. Appendix B). We begin by studying the health investment zt⁎ when
the estimate surviving probability q^t varies. In order to do that, we as-
sume that Xt, wt and rt + 1 are given. We calculate the total differential:
dzt  φz þ dq^t  φq^t ¼ 0. As it falls, preventive health investment in-
creases since the agent's life expectancy decreases: dz

t
dq^ t
¼ −φq^φz b0. Now,
let's turn our attention to the variation of wage ratewt related to health
investment zt. Our ﬁndings indicate that the increase in wage rate in-
duces the agent to increase his health investment: dz

t
dwt
¼− φwφz > 0.
This relation is classic. At ﬁrst sight, this relation may seem rather sim-
plistic, but we will see later that it turns out to be a complex issue
when related to the general equilibrium. We will observe, for example,
that the enrichment of agents does not systematically incite them to in-
crease their efforts to prevent the spread of the disease through behav-
ior change. It depends notably on other determining factors. We will
come back to this point later (cf. infra numerical example). On other
side, it's important to take into account the relation between interest
rate rt + 1, and health investment zt⁎. It appears that an increased rate
of return during the second period can lead to an increase in the agent's
health investment during the ﬁrst period: dz

t
drtþ1
¼− φrφz > 0. Wemay also
determine that the second period of consumption brings about an in-
creased function of rate of return. There is a complementarily between
second period of consumption and investment. The agent who invests
in his health increases his probability of receiving an income in the sec-
ond period. It is, therefore, reasonable to assume that health investment
increases under the effect of rt + 1 increasing. This conﬁrms the key role
of zt⁎, which it has to play in effective disease management, control and
prevention.We study, therefore, the key relation between Xt and zt⁎We
get: dz

t
dXt
¼− φxφz b0: The aforementioned relation plays a determining role
in our study, since it reveals that an increased disease levelmay actually
discourage an agent to invest in health, even if, we assume that the
representative agent's investment “has a certain weight in health”.
Our study also enables the obvious interaction between health and the
health environment. TheWHO2008 report notes a phenomenon of dis-
couragement to the emphasis of the epidemic. Agents (individuals, fam-
ilies) are always encouraged to invest in health face, for example, in the
scattering of the provision of care and the lack of coherence between the
different aid devices. Furthermore, according to Lleras-Muney and
Jayachandran (2008): “Conversely, when life expectancy declines, for
example because of HIV or civil war, the dampened incentive to invest
is an important cost to consider.” p.30. On the whole, in our model, in-
vestment to prevent the spread of the disease can be lower when the
disease level is higher. As far as our ﬁndings are concerned, it is interest-
ing to observe that Momota et al. (2005) present an important result
concerning a comparative statics: “agents increase their preventive
behavior in equilibrium when the degree of prevalence of disease in a
society is severer (…)”, p.10. Moreover, Chakraborty et al. (2007) are
in accordance with this idea. In their model, preventive investment is
greater when the disease level increases. It would appear; therefore,
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ment to provide treatment, care and support.
Let us now move on to another context in which a representative
ﬁrm operates in perfectly competitive markets to produce the ﬁnal
goods using capital Kt and units of labor Lt to ensure optimal efﬁciency.
The production function can, therefore, be expressed as Yt = F(Kt, Lt).
This function can be represented as a per capita production: yt =
f(kt), where kt = Kt/Lt is the capital per capita. Note that this function
is neoclassical with constant returns to scale. Supposing total depre-
ciation, we expressed the optimal conditions for the representative
ﬁrm:
rt ¼ r ktð Þ ¼ f ′ ktð Þ−1: ð3Þ
wt ¼ w ktð Þ ¼ f ktð Þ−f ′ ktð Þ  kt : ð4Þ
According to the neoclassical theory, proﬁt maximization requires
that the marginal product of capital (minus one) equals the interest
rate and that the marginal product of labor equals the wage.
3. Equilibrium and dynamics of the economy
3.1. Deﬁnition of general equilibrium
In each period, the general equilibrium is deﬁned as a nine-
dimensional system by a system of nine equations with nine
unknowns: the unknowns are deﬁned by {Zt, ct, Xt, it, rt, wt, dt, qt, kt},
and the number of equations is obtained from program of agents and
equilibriums on the markets. In the inter-temporal dimension, equilib-
rium dimension is reduced to a two-dimensional system. The ﬁrst
dynamic is obtained from the equilibrium on the capital market, we
have: Kt + 1 = It− Kt. From Eqs. (3) and (4), we obtain the capital
dynamics: ktþ1 ¼ ψ ktð Þ ¼ τw ktð Þ−Kt1þn . We know that when the tax rate
is equal to unity (τ = 1), ﬁrst period consumption and health invest-
ment are null. This is an extreme casewhere forced savings, it, tends to-
ward its upper limit.
Nowwe will examine the disease dynamics. To summarize, we as-
sume that disease level, in the next period Xt + 1 is determined both
the level of aggregate health investment Zt and by disease level, Xt,
in the current period:
Xtþ1 ¼ G Zt ;Xtð Þ;∀Xt > 0;
Xt ¼ 0⇒Xtþ1 ¼ 0;

ð5Þ
where the value of the index Xt is inherited from the choices made by
previous generations. It can be assumed that the function G, of class
C2, satisﬁes the following relations:G′zb0 and G
′
X > 0. The ﬁrst relation
means that the increase of health investment (Zt) decreases the disease
level (Xt + 1). The second relation can be interpreted as the temporal
cumulative effect of the disease level. According to our assumptions,Case (i) :
Fig. 1. Existence of critical threwe assume that a certain disease level exists, such as Xt > 0. Now, we
examine the disease dynamics under myopic foresight. The agent pro-
vides the future value from the value observed in the ﬁrst period:
rt + 1 = rt. However, there are many ways to model the myopic fore-
sight (e.g. De La Croix and Michel (2000)). Moreover, the assumption
of myopic foresight can be reasonably applied to a developing economy
where the production, distribution, and quality of information are often
lacking. The disease dynamics is obtained by substituting the value
of health investment at the equilibrium prices. So we express the opti-
mal health investment as function of capital per capita and disease
level: Zt ¼ l zt ¼ l g w ktð Þ;R ktð Þ;Xt ; q^tð Þ≡ϕ kt ;Xtð Þ. We examine the
disease dynamic of this economy. This dynamic equilibrium path is
obtained from Eq. (5) and Zt = ϕ(kt, Xt), and we express it as
Xt + 1 = G(ϕ(kt, Xt), Xt) ≡ ϒ(kt, Xt). This dynamical path shows that
the current disease level affects directly (i.e., the second argument of
G) and indirectly the future disease level. Indirect route: Xt affects the
aggregate health investment Zt directly, and this change modiﬁes the
level of Xt + 1. It is interesting to notice that the previous indirect
route doesn't occur when the level of health investment is ﬁxed on
the upper or the lower boundaries. According to the model assump-
tions, health investment is bounded, 0 ≤ zt ≤ (1 − τ) × wt. So when
the agent doesn't invest in his health zt = 0, aggregate investment is
zero Zt = 0. In this case, G (0, Xt), the corresponding future disease is
only directly affected by the current disease level. Due to the assump-
tion of the model, the disease tends to explode. In contrast, the agent
may decide to invest all his income after paying tax: zt = (1 − τ) ×
wt. Therefore, the aggregate health investment is independent of the
current disease level, Zt = l × (1 − τ) × wt. Also in this case, G
(l × (1 − τ) × wt, Xt), the indirect route doesn't appear. We study
the disease dynamics Xt + 1 = G (ϕ (kt, Xt), Xt) ≡ ϒ(kt, Xt). First,
for a given disease level, the derivative is expressed as follow:
dXtþ1
dkt
¼ ∂ϒ∂kt ¼ G
′
ϕ  ϕ′kt . With Zt = ϕ (kt, Xt), the functionG
′
ϕ is the deriv-
ative of future disease level with respect to health investment and ϕ′kt
shows the impact of capital variation on the level of health investment.
By assumption we know that G′zb0, the increase of health investment
induces the reduction of disease level, so G′ϕb0. The sign of
dXtþ1
dkt
de-
pends on the impact of capital on health investment ϕ′kt . They are
two possibilities. First, the increase of capital per capita induces an in-
crease of health investment,ϕ′kt > 0. In this case, the increase of health
investment allows to reduce the future disease level dXtþ1dkt b0. Second, the
increase of capital leads a decrease of health investment ϕ′ktb0. In this
case, the increase of capital discourages the health investment and
leads the spread of disease: dXtþ1dkt > 0. Now, for a given capital per capita,
the derivative is then expressed: dXtþ1dXt ¼
∂ϒ
∂Xt
¼ G′ϕ  ϕ′Xt þ G
′
Xt
. We can
examine the sign of this variation. First and foremost, it depends on
disease variation due to the modiﬁcation of health investment ϕ′Xt . ByCase (ii) :
shold and attractive point.
Fig. 2. Existence and uniqueness of stationary capital.
5 Note: our ﬁndings indicate that if the function ϒ is not monotonic, then we can in
no way guarantee the existence and uniqueness of X , since we have several possibili-
ties that will satisfy the equation.
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vestment. Since the agent is becoming increasingly discouraged in the
light of an increased disease level, the result is, needless to say, negative.
Then it depends on the component of disease level linked to health in-
vestment,G′ϕb0. Finally, it depends on the element of prevalence of the
disease itself, G′Xt . Due to the fact that G
′
Xt
> 0. To sum up, then, for a
given capital per capita, the function ϒ(kt, Xt) is an increasing function
with respect to current disease level, ∂ϒ∂Xt > 0. So, for a given capital per
capita, the condition of monotony of function ϒ depends on his second
derivative expressed: ∂
2ϒ
∂X2t
¼ ϕ′Xt 
∂G′ϕ
∂Xt
þ G′ϕ 
∂ϕ′Xt
∂Xt
þ ∂G
′
Xt
∂Xt
. To ensure the
monotony of functionϕ, ∂
2ϒ
∂X2t
signmust be consistent. Hence, after having
investigated all our hypotheses, two possibilities remain: (i) ∂
2ϒ
∂X2t
≥0 and
(ii) ∂
2ϒ
∂X2t
b0.
Thus, in the ﬁrst case (i), it follows that limXt→0 þ ∂ϒ∂Xt b1, then the
function ϒ is convex, for a given capital per capita. In the second case
(ii), it follows that limXt→0 þ ∂ϒ∂Xt→∞, the function ϒ is concave, for a
given capital per capita. To summarize, if these conditions of monoto-
nicity are satisﬁed, we establish the following property.
Property 2. If the monotony conditions are satisﬁed, then:
• for ϒ convex, ∀kt ﬁxed, a critical threshold Xth will be reached. If the
initial disease level X0 is below the threshold, then the epidemic
will gradually disappear. If X0 > Xth, there is a higher degree of
prevalence of the disease, the state of the economy will be seriously
endangered and at risk.
• for ϒ concave, ∀kt ﬁxed, an attractive point Xat will be reached. If
the initial prevalence disease X0 is below the attractive point, then
the disease will gradually tends to this value. If X0 > Xat, the disease
will decrease gradually to converge to this value, Xat.
The following ﬁgures illustrate this property.
We can easily verify the existence of the critical threshold, Xth, and
the attractive point, Xat, by studying the disease dynamics, for a ﬁxed
level of capital. This complex relation between disease and capital is
consistent with empirical observations. According to Bonnel (2000),
causality between economic growth and spread of disease is complex:
“As shown by the previous system of equations the relations between
HIV/AIDS and economic development are complex, particularly because
of reverse causality. While HIV/AIDS reduces economic growth, eco-
nomic growth can increase or decrease the spread of the HIV epidemic.
On one hand, economic development can slow down the spread of the
HIV epidemic. On the other hand, the process of economic development
can facilitate the spread of the HIV epidemic”. p.4. To sum up, the dy-
namics of this economy with disease is, thereby, expressed as:
ktþ1 ¼ ψ ktð Þ;
ktþ1 ¼ ϒ kt ;Xtð Þ:
Now, we will examine the dynamical system of this economy by
focusing our attention on steady states.
3.2. Existence of steady states
The steady state of this system is expressed as, ktþ1 ¼ kt ¼ k and
Xtþ1 ¼ Xt ¼ X :
k ¼
τ w k
 
−k
1þ n ; X ¼ G ϕ k;X
 
;X
 
≡ϒ k;X
 
:
Let us ﬁrst of all explore the dynamics of capital, ∀kt ≠ 0, (2 + n)
kt = τ × w(kt), with w′(kt) > 0 and w″(kt) b 0. According to Inada
conditions, limkt→0 þw′ ktð Þ→þ ∞; the function τ × w (kt) is aconcave function. Since w(0) = 0 then k ¼ 0 is also a steady state,
this case will not be taken into account. Hence, at the steady state,
there is a unique stationary capital, k > 0 (Fig. 2).
Now, let us move on to our next point, which concerns the disease
at steady state, X ¼ ϒ k;X
 
. If there is an X that satisﬁes this equa-
tion, then the steady state will be deﬁned. At this point we will exam-
ine the function ϒ k;Xt
 
for a ﬁxed level of capital per capita, kt ¼ k.
As before, for a ﬁxed level of capital, the function ϒ is an increasing
function, ∂ϒ∂Xt > 0. To ensure the existence and uniqueness of at least
one X , the monotony condition of function ϒ will be satisﬁed.5 It fol-
lows from the above-mentioned remark that long-term equilibrium
can be characterized by one steady state: E ¼ k;X
 
. The study of
the steady state E shows that there is a long-term equilibrium with
positive disease level. In the last case we observed the existence of
an asymmetry between capital per capita and disease level: capital
per capita is independent ofX , whereas the disease level is directly af-
fected by the amount of capital. The independence of the capital level
relative to the disease is explained by its state funding, through tax.
With regard to the existence, uniqueness, and stability properties of
the steady state equilibrium, we state the following proposition:
Proposition 1. With regard to the stability of the non-trivial steady
state equilibrium, the following statements hold:
• The non-trivial steady state equilibrium is locally unstable, and in
the neighborhood of the steady state, an equilibrium path is mono-
tonic if and only if ϒ is convex.
• The non-trivial steady state equilibrium is locally stable, and in the
neighborhood of the steady state, an equilibrium path is monotonic
if and only if ϒ is concave.
Proof. Technically, we study the locally linearized dynamical system
(e.g. Appendix C). We obtain the following two eigenvalues: vp1 ¼
τw′ kð Þ−1
1þn
 
and vp2 ¼ G′ϕ  ϕ′Xt þ G′Xt > 0: The ﬁrst eigenvalue vp1
is always less than one in absolute value, |vp1| b 1 (e.g. Appendix D).
As for the position of the second eigenvalue, vp2 ¼ ∂ϒ∂Xt , is deter-
mined by the shape, concave or convex, of ϒ. The steady state E ¼
k;X
 
is a locally unstable saddle point due to the convexity of func-
tion ϒ, |vp2| > 1. When ϒ is concave, E is a locally stable due to the
fact that second eigenvalue is upper than one in absolute, |vp2| b 1.
(cf. Fig. 3). □
Fig. 3. Representation of the steady state.
476 L. Augier, A. Yaly / Economic Modelling 33 (2013) 471–481The following study concerns the comparative statics performed
in the neighborhood of the state with disease. Disease dynamics is
characterized by an implicit relation between capital per capita and
disease level X = G(ϕ(k,X), X) ≡ ϒ(k,X). According to the assump-
tions on the function ϒ, we can analyze the effect of disease variation
X compared to capital per capita variation k by calculating the total
differential: dX ¼ ϒ′k  dkþϒ′X  dX. By simplifying this expression,
near the steady state, we get:
dX
dk
¼ ϒ
′
k
1−ϒ′X
¼ G
′
ϕ  ϕ′k
1− G′ϕ  ϕ′X þ G′X
  : ð6Þ
Assuming that we characterize the variableϒ′X as the speed diffu-
sion of the disease, for a given capital per capita. Due to the previous
study of the disease functionϒ, we know that if the function is convex
(the speed of diffusion of disease has intensiﬁed) then ϒ′X≥1. And if
it's concave (the speed is relatively slow) then and ifϒ′Xb1. According
to the previous hypothesis on function ϒ, we know that sign of the
expression in relation (6) depends on the agents' preventive behavior
ϕ′k. As a consequence, we can sum up the discussion above as follows:
Property 3. With regard to the properties of function ϒ, the following
statements hold:
i. ϒ convex: if ϕ′k > 0; so dXdk > 0 and if ϕ
′
kb0; so dXdk b0; dZ e 0;
ii. ϒ concave: if ϕ′k > 0; so dXdk b0, dZ > 0 and if ϕ
′
kb0; so dXdk > 0;
dZ b 0.
This property shows that when the speed of disease diffusion is
decreasing, the preventive behavior allows the agent to ﬁght against
disease. The amount of productive capital is therefore particularly
important to make the agent's health investment easier. In other
words, the raise of health investment reduces the level of disease
when disease is increasing.
We illustrate geometrically the previous proposition, by using the
phase diagram (e.g. Azariadis (1993)).Weﬁrst introduce the capital dy-
namics. When ktbk, capital accumulation is observed, kt + 1 ≥ kt. Con-
versely, when kt > k, then capital declines, kt + 1 ≤ kt. Let us, now,
construct the phase diagramof the disease dynamics. For a given capital
per capita, the function ϒ can be convex or concave with respect to Xt.
Thus for a given capital per capita kt = k, assuming that ϒ convex
Xt + 1 ≥ Xt if Xt≥X and Xt + 1 b Xt if XtbX (e.g. Property 2 and Fig. 1
in case of k ¼ k). But if ϒ is concave, Xt + 1 ≥ Xt if XtbX and
Xt + 1 b Xt if Xt≥X (e.g. Property 2 and Fig. 1 in case of ¼ k). Using
these relations, Proposition 1 and Property 3, we can sum up the trajec-
tory of the system in the neighborhood of the steady state, by
representing the phase diagram (Fig. 4).
Thus the study of the stability of the economy in the neighborhood
of the steady state, allows us to establish the complex interactionbetween physical capital and disease level. This interaction is also
explained by the form of the aggregate health investment, one of
the key variables of the model. Indeed, we have established that a
variation of health investment can have a direct positive or negative
effect by changing the stationary value of the disease. Thus the dis-
ease dynamics depends mainly on the shape of the health investment
function. The speed diffusion and the spread of disease are explained
by the form of health investment function. All these interactions in-
duce that in some cases, the capital increase can be consistent with
a decrease of disease level. As a positive internal effect, it is important
to note that when each representative agent increases his own health
investment, the aggregate level of health investment also rises, and
the disease level will increase. This effect can intuitively be inter-
preted as how the agent's preventive behavior can allow one to
ﬁght against disease. This quite reasonable result under our assump-
tions doesn't exhaust all the possibilities. Wemay observe a reduction
of aggregate health investment management and prevention, when
disease level increases dZ > 0 (e.g. Property 3). In this perspective,
the level of physical capital is also important because it modiﬁes the
level of aggregate health investment. These two characteristics are
therefore to be considered in the development programs and systems
to ﬁght against disease in developing countries. But it is important to
notice that an increase in the disease cannot be systematically associ-
ated with a decrease in aggregate health investment management
and prevention efforts. Thus, the relationship is signiﬁcantly more
complex than it would appear at ﬁrst sight.
4. An example
In this section we present in a ﬁrst step a model with explicit func-
tions in order to calculate the general equilibrium. Then in a second
step we perform numerical simulations from the previous model.
We assume that the surviving probability of the agent is expressed
as follows: q zt ;Xtð Þ ¼ ztAXt
 α
, where A > 0, 0 b α b 1, ∀t, A × Xt ≥ zt.
Now, let us turn our attention to the use of the following speciﬁc
utility functions: u(ct) = ctμ and ν(ct) = dt + 1ν , with 0 b μ b 1 and
0 b v ≤ 1. We assume that the agent is neutral to the risk of second
period consumption v = 1 (e.g. Azariadis and Smith (1998)). So, by
solving Eq. (3), taking into account Property 1, it can be established
that there is a unique optimal investment for health, if and only if
α = μ.
The optimal health investment is expressed:
zt ¼ 1−τð Þ wt= ew
1
μ−1
t  R
1
μ−1
tþ1  X
α
1−μ
t þ 1
 
¼ g wt ;Rtþ1;Xt ; q^t
 
where e ¼ ταβμq^ tAα
  1
μ−1 (Proof, Appendix E).
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Fig. 4. Phase diagram.
477L. Augier, A. Yaly / Economic Modelling 33 (2013) 471–481We assume a Cobb–Douglas production function, Yt = F(Kt,Lt) =
B × Ktθ × Lt1 − θ, where 0 b θ b 1 and B > 0. So relations (3) and (4)
are expressed as: rt = B × θ × Ktθ − 1 − 1 andwt = B × (1 − θ) × Ktθ.
The study is then performed using the previous functions. The
capital dynamics may be expressed: ktþ1 ¼ τB 1−θð Þk
θ
t−kt
1þn . The disease
dynamics is expressed: Xtþ1 ¼ ξlzt  Xt , with ξ > 0 (cf. Appendix F).
Once the existence and uniqueness of steady state theoretically
established by Proposition 1, we obtain the following dynamics at
steady state:
k ¼ ψ kð Þ ¼ τ  1−θð Þ  B k
θ−k
1þ n ;
X ¼ ϒ k;Xð Þ ¼ ξ
e θ 1−θð ÞB2  k2θ−1  X−α
  1
μ−1þ 1
l 1−θð Þ  1−τð Þ  B kθ  X:
The resolution of this system will enable us to establish the following
property.
Property 4. The steady state values are deﬁned for all k≥ k ¼ ξϑ
 1
θ
,
with ϑ = l × B(1 − θ)(1 − τ).
It can be shown that two possible relations exist between the
prevalence of the disease and the capital per capita at the steady
state E. Either the growth of per-worker capital translates into an in-
creased of disease level, or conversely it establishes a corresponding
reduced of the disease level. Health policies deriving from k, ϕ′k, is
dependent upon both technological parameters, θ, and level of capi-
tal. Hence the following property:
Property 5. Sign of dXdk depends on θ and k. Two possibilities:
■ for θ∈ 0; 13−μ
h
, if kbk^ k > k^
 
, then ϕ′k > 0 ϕ
′
kb0
 
; and dXdk > 0
dX
dk b0
 
.
■ for θ∈ 13−μ ;1
h i
, so ϕ′k > 0, and dXdk > 0;∀k, with k^ ¼ ξ 2θ−1ð Þϑ 3θ−θπ−1ð Þ
 1
θ
.Proof. Appendix G
These results can be assessed numerically. We will illustrate the
main ﬁndings results of the model using numerical simulations
Maple software. By asking θ = 0.14 and μ = 0.4, we are in a conﬁgu-
ration where production requires more labor than capital θ ¼
0:14b 13−μ ¼ 0:38. According to Property 1, we have a unique optimal
investment in health policies, if and only if: μ = α. We assume that
μ = α = 0.4. The other parameters take the following values: β ¼
0:23;ν ¼ 1; q^t ¼ 0:2;B ¼ 50; l ¼ 3;n ¼ 0:1;A ¼ 20; τ ¼ 0:2; ξ ¼ 100.
In other words, the rate of population growth is relatively high (n =
0.1). The agent believes that his estimating survival probability is low
q^t ¼ 0:2ð Þ. This environment can explain a level of health investment
relatively low. In this sense, the direct impact of the current disease
level on the future disease level is relatively important (ξ =100).
As the weight of the individual health investment on the aggregate
health investment is relatively high (l = 3). The tax rate of the
agent is not negligible (τ = 0.2). The impact of individual health
investment on the survival probability is about average (α = 0.4).
Given the value of β, the agent has a preference for the present
relatively low. With the model assumptions, the survival probability
is a function with respect to capital per capita and disease level.
In this numerical example, it is deﬁne as: q kt ;Xtð Þ ¼ 1:242
k0:14t
0:006k1:2t X1:67t þXt
 0:4
. Thus, there exists a set {(kt,Xt)} on which the
probability is not deﬁned because q(kt,Xt) > 1. We may recall the
deﬁnition domain of capital per capita kt > k ¼ ξϕ
 1
θ ¼ 0:798. By re-
placing the variables by their equilibrium values, we obtain the dy-
namical system:
ktþ1 ¼ 7:818 k0:14t −0:9 kt ;
Xtþ1 ¼ 0:006 k1:06t  X1:67t þ 0:969 k−0:14t  Xt :
(
ð7Þ
478 L. Augier, A. Yaly / Economic Modelling 33 (2013) 471–481For a ﬁxed capital per capita, this dynamics is a continuous and in-
creasing function (Appendix F). The study of the structure of the dis-
ease dynamics, enable us to show that the function is convex. Hence
from Property 2, the evolution of the disease, for a ﬁxed level of cap-
ital kt, is characterized by a critical threshold. Indeed, as an example, if
we set the level of capital per capita kt = 8, the disease, Xt + 1 =
0.055 × Xt1.67 + 0.72 × Xt admits a threshold Xth = 11.09. If the ini-
tial disease level is found to be below the threshold (X0 = 9 b Xth),
then the disease gradually disappears (X1 = 8.67 b X0). On the
other hand, if the disease level is greater than the initial disease
threshold level (X0 = 14 > Xth) the disease level intensiﬁes (X1 =
14.64 > X0). Once the dynamical path of the model established, we
may characterize the properties of the steady state economy. For an
optimal assessment of the process (7), we need to determine the
stationary state. We know that stationary capital per capita is indepen-
dent of the disease level, we obtain k = 5.15. The analysis of steady
states of the system (7), clearly reveals stationary state: E =
(5.15,16.98). With these numerical values, we may identify the
case (i) of Property 5, whereby all the stationary states of the preva-
lence of the disease are determined for a given capital per capita:
X = g(k) = 1.99 × (103.2 × k0.4 − 100 × k1.2)1.5. Whereby all the
stationary states of the prevalence of the disease are determined
for a given capital per capita (Fig. 5).
It may be observed that in the function of the level of capital per
capita two conﬁgurations are possible: kbk^ ¼ 1:93 or k > k^ ¼ 1:93.
For a relatively low level of capital kbk^ ¼ 1:93
 
, an increase in capital
(k = 1→ k = 1.5) generates greater disease level (X = 11.41→ X =
26.93). Based on the values of the simulations, capital growth leads to
both an increase in the wage rate and production. Agents become rela-
tively better endowed in capital, the amount of tax increases then (i =
8.60→ i = 9.10). As far as consumption is concerned, the increase is
accompanied by an increase in the ﬁrst period consumption (c =
1.06→ c = 1.84). Ultimately, the utility of the ﬁrst period increases
(u(c) = 1.02→ u(c) = 1.56). We may recall that at time t when the
agent makes his choice, he is aware only of his surviving probability,
but he must estimate the mean probability q^t = 0.2, to calculate his
future income. So when the agent takes into account the estimated
probability, the increase of disease level causes a decrease of the second
period consumption (d = 301→ d = 225). These ﬁndings may be
explained by the fact that a reduced interest rate (r = 6→ r = 3.94)
is not compensated by the increase in forced savings. The agent's behav-
ior is characterized by both his preferences and expectations. These
factors may counteract the positive repercussions engendered by the
increase in capital per capita (i.e. increased threshold Xth). The30
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Fig. 5. Sets of all steady states θ∈ 0; 13−μ
hh
.combination of reduced optimal investment for health in effective pre-
vention and disease control and higher infection rates, may, therefore,
correspond to a reduced survival probability of the agent (q =
0.46→ q =0.33). Overall, changes in ﬁrst and second period of con-
sumption may result in a decline in the agent's life expectancy
(E(V) = 33.09→E (V) = 18.55). When k > k^ ¼ 1:93, the increase of
capital (k =5.15→ k = 5.30) causes a decrease in speed diffusion of
the disease (X = 16.98→ X = 16.55), the stationary disease level,
the interest rate on both consumption and an increase in forced savings.
In contrast, the equilibriumprobability of survival of the agent increases
(q =0.395→ q = 0.399) whereas its estimated probability is equal to
0.2. It is to be observed that health investment is stable. The fact that
investment does not always vary, can be explained from the study of
Z = ϕ(k,X). According to Property 5, for relatively low capital values
kbk^ ¼ 1:93
 
, we can verify thatϕ′kb0. In contrast, for values of capital
relatively high k > k^ ¼ 1:93
 
, we obtain ϕ′k > 0. A direct relation
between health investment and the current disease level is negative
(ϕ′kb0). The following ﬁgure shows the optimal health investment
(z* = 34.40 × k0.14/0.006 × k1.2 × X0.6 + 1) (Fig. 6).
This previous ﬁgure illustrates the complexity of the relation
between health investment, disease level and capital per capita. The
study of the dynamical system of this economy reveals the essential
role of the aggregate health investment. The shape of the Z in particular
allows it to characterize the speed diffusion, the intensity of the disease,
and the interactions between the economic growth and disease.
5. Conclusion
We care about health not only because it affects mortality, quality of
life and morbidity, but also because it may affect the economic growth.
This paper makes the case that poor health due to infectious diseases
has effects in explaining some economic downturns. More precisely,
we present a closed-economy model with overlapping-generations.
We use the general equilibrium model of economic growth to study
the incidence of infectious diseases. Using this model, we show that
impact of infectious diseases depend on economic incentives, rational
and preventive behavior.We considered the agent's preventive behavior
explicitly by studying the dynamical system of this economy. Incor-
porating rational behavior (i.e. individual health investment) in amacro-
economic disease structure is our key theoretical innovation.
Our main results are twofold. First, for a given level of capital, the
disease function is characterized by a critical threshold. It may beFig. 6. Health investment θ∈ 0; 13−μ
hh
.
Case where θ × (2 + n) − 1 > 0 Case where θ × (2 + n) − 1 > 0
⇔θ > 12þn⇒ vp1j j ¼ θ 2þnð Þ−11þn ⇔θb 12þn⇒ vp1j j ¼− θ 2þnð Þ−11þn
Is eigenvalue upper than 1 Is eigenvalue upper than 1
vp1j j≥1⇔ θ 2þnð Þ−11þn ≥1; vp1j j≥1⇔− θ 2þnð Þ−11þn ≥1;
⇔ θ ≥ 1 impossible by deﬁnition
0 b θ b 1.
⇔θ≤ −n2þn b0 impossible by deﬁnition
0 b θ.
The ﬁrst eigenvalue is always less
than 1 in absolute value |vp1| b 1.
The ﬁrst eigenvalue is always less than 1
in absolute value |vp1| b 1.
Proof: Proof:
vp1j jb1⇔ θ 2þnð Þ−11þn b1 vp1j jb1⇔− θ 2þnð Þ−11þn b1
⇔ θ b 1, which is true by deﬁnition. ⇔θ > −n2þnb0, which is true by deﬁnition.
479L. Augier, A. Yaly / Economic Modelling 33 (2013) 471–481observed that if the disease level of a country is below the critical,
then the disease progressively disappears. If, however, it rises above
the critical, then the increasing speed of the disease becomes a seri-
ous risk factor for the economy, and the state of the economy be-
comes extremely precarious. Second, when the prevalence of the
disease intensiﬁes, it can be observed that the trajectories of the sys-
tem, representing the economy, diverge towards the long-term equi-
librium. The disease tends to disappear due to the relatively low
initial degree of prevalence of the disease. However, in the neighbor-
hood of the steady state where the disease level is relatively high, the
trajectories of the system gradually move away from equilibrium due
to the increasing the spread of disease. The trajectories of capital per
capita and prevalence of the disease level, then tend to diverge. This
strong ﬁnding is generated by our hypothesis of the model.
An important consequence of these results is the impact of physi-
cal capital due to its inﬂuence on health investment policies and dis-
ease management. The increase in capital per capita in order to ﬁght
against disease is not always sufﬁcient. Indeed, depending on the in-
tensity of the disease, the increase in capital may cause an increase or
decrease in aggregate health investment. For example, heightened
prevalence of disease can actually dissuade an agent from investing
in health even if, we assume that the representative agent's invest-
ment has potential beneﬁts in disease management. So, rising capital
per capita does not prove very effective when the disease is relatively
severe: “The steady-state infection level is reduced from 0.31 to 0.19
percent and capital per capita is reduced from 4 to 3.5.”, p.491
(Cuddington et al., 1994). It is vital to take these factors into account
when implementing programs and prevention campaigns to halt and
reverse disease (HIV/AIDS) in developing countries. The study of
comparative statics also demonstrates that long-term equilibrium is
characterized by complex relation between disease level and eco-
nomic growth due to the level of health investment. The macroeco-
nomic equilibrium can be modiﬁed by changing the appropriate
microeconomic variables. It is, therefore, crucial to point out that in-
creased health investment is not always sufﬁcient to reverse the
spread of disease. It is extremely interesting to assess prevention ef-
forts in the healthcare by investigating both the public and private
sectors.
Appendix A. Existence of a unique optimal health investment
From Eq. (2), we obtain the two following functions: F ztð Þ≡
du 1−τð Þwt−ztð Þ
dzt
and M ztð Þ≡β  q′z zt ;Xtð Þ  v 1þrtþ1ð Þτwtq^t
 
. The health
investment is bounded 0 ≤ zt ≤ (1 − τ) × wt. Function F(zt) is con-
tinuous and increasing, dF zð Þdz ≡−
d2u 1−τð Þwt−ztð Þ
dzt2
> 0. If zt = (1 − τ) ×
wt, then limzt→ 1−τð Þwt F ztð Þ→þ ∞.
Function M(zt) is continuous and decreasing with
dM ztð Þ
dzt
¼ β
q″z zt ;Xtð Þ  v 1þrtþ1ð Þτwtq^t
 
b0.
If zt = 0 then limzt→0M ztð Þ ¼ q′z zt ;Xtð Þ→þ ∞.
Hence the Property 1.
Appendix B. Comparative statics
φz ¼ u″ 1−τð Þ wt−ztð Þ þ β  q″z zt ;Xtð Þ  ν
1þ rtþ1
  τ wt
q^t
 
b0;
φw ¼−u″ 1−τð Þ wt−ztð Þ  1−τð Þ þ β  q′z zt ;Xtð Þ  ν′ dtþ1
 
 1þ rtþ1
  τ
q^t
> 0;
φX ¼ β  q″zX zt ;Xtð Þ  ν
1þ rtþ1
  τ wt
q^t
 
b0;
φr ¼ β  q′z zt ;Xtð Þ  ν′ dtþ1
  τ wt
qt
> 0:
φqt ¼−β  q
′
z z

t ;Xtð Þ  ν′ dtþ1
  1þ rtþ1
  τ
q^2t
b0:Appendix C. Jacobian and steady state
Jacobian:
J ¼
∂ktþ1
∂kt
∂ktþ1
∂Xt
∂Xtþ1
∂kt
∂Xtþ1
∂Xt
0
BB@
1
CCA ¼
τ w′ kð Þ−1
1þ nð Þ 0
l ϕ′k  G′ϕ G′ϕ  ϕ′X þ G′X
0
B@
1
CA:
Jacobian trace:
TrJ ¼ τ w
′ kð Þ−1
1þ nð Þ þ G
′
ϕ  ϕ′X þ G′X :
Jacobian determinant:
DetJ ¼ τ w
′ kð Þ−1
1þ nð Þ
 !
 G′ϕ  ϕ′X þ G′X
 
:
Characteristic polynomial: p(h) = h2 − TrJ × h + DetJ By deﬁnition
the roots of the characteristic polynomial are the eigenvalues. Hence:
p hð Þ ¼ 0⇔h2− τ w
′ kð Þ−1
1þ nð Þ þ G
′
ϕ  ϕ′X þ G′X
 !
 hþ τ w
′ kð Þ−1
1þ nð Þ
 !
 G′ϕ  ϕ′X þ G′X
 
¼ 0:
After solving this polynomial, we obtain the eigenvalues.
Appendix D. Position of the ﬁrst eigenvalue from 1
First eigenvalue: vp1j j ¼ θ 2þnð Þ−11þn
			 			, we have two possibilities.Appendix E. Optimal health investment
maxzt E Vð Þ⇒μ  1−τð Þ wt−ztð Þ
μ−1 ¼ α  β  τ wt  Rtþ1
q^t  A Xtð Þα
 zα−1t ;
1−τð Þ wt  z
1−α
μ−1
t −z
μ−α
μ−1
t ¼
α  β  τ wt  Rtþ1
μ  q^t  A Xtð Þα
  1
μ−1
:
To solve this polynomial in Z, variable change: Dt ¼ Z
1
μ−1
t , so:
⇔ 1−τð Þ wt  D1−αt −Dμ−αt ¼
α  β  τ wtRtþ1
μ  q^t  A Xtð Þα
  1
μ−1
factorize the left expression by Dt−α:
⇔ 1−τð Þ wt  Dt−Dμt
  D−αt ¼ α  β  τ wt  Rtþ1μ  q^t  A Xtð Þα
  1
μ−1
;
⇔ 1−τð Þ wt  Dt−Dμt−
α  β  τ wt  Rtþ1
μ  q^t  A Xtð Þα
  1
μ−1  Dαt ¼ 0;
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⇔ 1−τð Þ wt−Dμ−1t −
α  β  τ wt  Rtþ1
μ  q^t  A Xtð Þα
  1
μ−1  Dα−1t ¼ 0;
⇔Dμ−1t þ
α  β  τ wt  Rtþ1
μ  q^t  A Xtð Þα
  1
μ−1  Dα−1t ¼ 1−τð Þ wt :
According to Property 1, there exists an unique zt, so α = μ.
⇔Dμ−1t þ
α  β  τ wt  Rtþ1
μ  qt  A Xtð Þα
  1
μ−1  Dα−1t ¼ 1−τð Þ wt
⇔Dμ−1t ¼
1−τð Þ wt
ew
1
μ−1
t  R
1
μ−1
tþ1  X
α
1−μ
t þ 1
 ! ;with e ¼ τ  α  β
μ  q^t  Aα
  1
μ−1
:
zt ¼
1−τð Þ wt
ew
1
μ−1
t  R
1
μ−1
tþ1  X
α
1−μ
t þ 1
  ¼ g wt ; rtþ1;Xt :
Appendix F. Determination of steady states
Disease dynamics:
Xtþ1 ¼
ξ
l 1−θð Þ  1−τð Þ  B kθt
 e θ 1−θð ÞB2  kθt  kθ−1tþ1  X−αt
  1
μ−1 þ 1
 
 Xt :
Dynamics at the steady states: hence kt + 1 = kt = k and Xt + 1 =
Xt = X
k ¼ τB 1−θð Þk
θ−k
1þ nð Þ
X ¼
e ξ B2θ 1−θð Þ
  1
μ−1k
3θ−θμ−1
μ−1 X
1
1−μ þ ξ kθ  X
l B 1−θð Þ 1−τð Þ
8>>><
>>>:
ð1;2Þ
(1)
⇔k 2þ n−τ  B 1−θð Þ  kθ−1
 
¼ 0:
The solution for Eq. (1) thus enables us to determine the steady
capital per capita: k = 0, or k ¼ 2þnτB 1−θð Þ
  1
θ−1. If the ﬁrst case is
impossible due to k = 0 then Eq. (2) cannot be deﬁne
limk→0k
θ
μ−1→0, limk→0k
θ−1
μ−1→þ ∞ and limk → 0kθ → + ∞.
Hence limk→0
eξ B2θ 1−θð Þð Þ 1μ−1k
3θ−θμ−1
μ−1 X
1
1−μþξkθX
lB 1−θð Þ 1−τð Þ is indeterminate.
The solution for this Eq. (2):
(2)
⇔X  l B 1−θð Þ 1−τð Þ  kθ−ξ Γ k2θ−1μ−1  X α1−μ þ 1
 
¼ 0;
with Γ ¼ α  β  τ  B
2  1−θð Þ  θ
μ  q^t
 Aα
 ! 1
μ−1
:
⇔rX ¼ lB 1−θð Þ 1−τð Þk
θ−ξ
ξ Γ k2θ−1μ−1
 !1−μ
α
:E ¼ kE;XEð Þ ¼
2þ n
τ  1−θð Þ  B
  1
θ−1
;
ϑ kθE−ξ
ξ Γ  k
2θ−1
μ−1
E
0
@
1
A
1−μ
α
0
B@
1
CA;
with Γ ¼ e B2θ 1−θð Þ
  1
μ−1
:
Appendix G. Proof Property 5
Disease variation:
dX
dk
¼ 1
ξΓ
 1−μ
α  1
α
 ϑ 3θ−θμ−1ð Þ  k
μ θ−1ð Þ−3θþ 2
μ−1 þ λ k
2−μ−2θ
μ−1
 !
 ϑ k
μ θ−1ð Þ−3θþ 2
μ−1 −ξ k
1−2θ
μ−1
 !1−2μ
α
;
with λ = ξ × (1 − 2θ). We may recall that optimal health investment
is expressed: Zt ¼ l 1−τð ÞB 1−θð Þk
θ
t
Γk
2θ−1
μ−1
t X
α
1−μ
t þ1
  where Γ ¼ e B2θ 1−θð Þ  1μ−1.
At the steady state: Z ¼ ϕ k;Xð Þ ¼ l 1−τð ÞB 1−θð Þkθ
Γk
2θ−1
μ−1 X
α
1−μþ1
  . Health invest-
ment yields with respect to capital:
ϕ′k ¼ l B 1−τð Þ 1−θð Þ
θkθ−1 Γ  k2θ−1μ−1X α1−μ þ 1
 
þ Γ 2θ−1ð Þ  k2θ−1μ−1−1X α1−μkθ
Γ  k2θ−1μ−1  X α1−μ þ 1
 2 :
Thus, we obtain:
ϕ′k ¼ l B 1−τð Þ 1−θð Þ
θ 1−μð Þ  kθ−1 þ θ 1−μð Þ þ 2θ−1ð Þð Þ  Γ  kθþθμ−μμ−1 X α1−μ
 
1−μð Þ Γ  k2θ−1μ−1  X α1−μ þ 1
 2 :
Hence,
ϕ′k ¼
l B 1−τð Þ 1−θð Þ
1−μð Þ Γ  k2θ−1μ−1  X α1−μ þ 1
 2
 Γ  k
θþθμ−μ
μ−1 X
α
1−μ
 
 3θ−θμ−1ð Þ þ θ 1−μð Þ  kθ−1

 
:
This yields two possibilities:
i)
3θ−θμ−1 > 0
l B 1−τð Þ 1−θð Þ
1−μð Þ Γ  k
2θ−1
μ−1  X
α
1−μ þ 1
 !2 > 0
Γ  k
θþ θμ−μ
μ−1 X
α
1−μ
 !
> 0
θ 1−μð Þ  kθ−1 > 0
with 3θ−θμ−1 > 0⇒ϕ′k > 0:
8>>>>><
>>>>>:
ii)
3θ−θμ−1b0
l B 1−τð Þ 1−θð Þ
1−μð Þ Γ  k
2θ−1
μ−1  X
α
1−μ þ 1
 !2 > 0;
Γ  k
θþ θμ−μ
μ−1 X
α
1−μ
 !
 3θ−θμ−1ð Þb0;
θ 1−μð Þ  kθ−1 > 0:
8>>>>><
>>>>>:
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θþθμ−μ
μ−1 X
α
1−μ
 
 3θ−θμ−1ð Þþ
h
θ 1−μð Þ
kθ−1.
Hence,
ϕ′k > 0⇔ Γ  k
θþθμ−μ
μ−1 X
α
1−μ
 
 3θ−θμ−1ð Þ þ θ 1−μð Þ  kθ−1 > 0
⇔ Γ  k
θþ θμ−μ
μ−1
 !
 3θ−θμ−1ð Þ > θ μ−1ð Þ  kθ−1
⇔Γ  k
θþ θμ−μ
μ−1 þ 1−θX
α
1−μb
θ μ−1ð Þ
3θ−θμ−1
⇔k
2θ−1
μ−1 b
θ μ−1ð Þ
3θ−θμ−1ð Þ  Γ  X
α
1−μ
:
In our study of the neighborhood of E, the stationary level of dis-
ease prevalence may be expressed g(k).
ϕ′k > 0⇔k
2θ−1
μ−1 b
θ μ−1ð Þ
3θ−θμ−1ð Þ  Γ  g kð Þ½  α1−μ
:
⇔k
2θ−1
μ−1 b
θ μ−1ð Þ  ξ Γ  k
2θ−1
μ−1
3θ−θμ−1ð Þ  Γ  ϑ kθ−ξ  with g kð Þ ¼ ϑ k
θ−ξ
ξ Γ  k
2θ−1
μ−1
0
B@
1
CA
1−μ
α
⇔1b
θ μ−1ð Þ  ξ
3θ−θμ−1ð Þ  ϑ kθ−ξ  ; according to the definition of k yields; it
follows that ϑ kθ−ξ
 
> 0; this is equivalent to :
⇔ϑ kθ−ξb θ μ−1ð Þ  ξ
3θ−θμ−1ð Þ⇔ϑ k
θ
bξ θ μ−1ð Þ
3θ−θμ−1ð Þ þ 1

 
;
⇔ϑ kθbξ 2θ−1
3θ−θμ−1ð Þ

 
;⇔kb
ξ 2θ−1ð Þ
ϑ 3θ−θμ−1ð Þ

 1
θ ¼ k^:To summarize relating to the neighborhood of E, ϕ′k > 0 if and
only if kbk^. And ϕ′kb0 if and only if k > k^.
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